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Abstract: In the post-Cold War period, there is more conflict than 
co-operation between Malaysia and Indonesia. This contradicts the spirit 
of ‘serumpun’, which has been the backdrop to the ‘special relationship’ 
between the two countries. This paper analyses the historical factors that 
give meaning to the ‘serumpun’ concept. ‘Serumpun’ reached its height 
during the era of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and President Suharto. 
I argue that in the post-Cold War period, there emerged significant 
differences in the perception of the concept of ‘serumpun’ due primarily 
to the generational gap and the new social, economic and political realities 
facing both countries. This paper suggests that the ‘serumpun’ concept can 
justifiably be maintained as the basis for a ‘special relationship’ between 
the two countries but new practical pillars (particularly co-operation 
in trade and investment) must be constructed to enrich the ‘serumpun’ 
concept.
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INTRODUCTION
Malaysia and Indonesia have a ‘special relationship’. In diplomacy, the term ‘special 
relationship’ is used to describe a condition where there are exceptionally strong ties 
between countries and even emotional connections between their leaders. The former 
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill used the term ‘special relationship’ to 
depict the exceptionally close cultural, diplomatic, historical and political relations 
that the United Kingdom had with the United States. In the Malaysian and Indonesian 
context, the ‘special relationship’ is defined by the serumpun concept, which has been a 
foundation of the relationship since both countries gained independence. However, the 
current general perception is that there is more conflict and rivalry than co-operation 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, contradicting the spirit of serumpun. 
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The Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak (Najib) 
asked the Golkar Party General Chairman, Aburizal Bakrie (Aburizal) in June 2011 on 
his visit to Malaysia with the Management Council of the Golkar Party Centre, “ Why 
we as bangsa serumpun and so close, yet have many problems”. Aburizal answered 
that the situation is normal. He added, “We are close with our wives, yet we are often 
distrust each other” (Kunjungan Ke Malaysia, 2011). 
Serumpun comes from the root word rumpun. In Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa 
Indonesia it means ‘cluster, clumps, family, group, stock or race’. According to Liow 
(2003) “(s)erumpun refers to the idea of co-identification on the basis of stock or racial 
lineage” (p. 327). The concept of serumpun has been used extensively by nationalist 
movements in both countries after the Second World War to strengthen solidarity in 
the drive for independence. 
The idea of serumpun can be used to study the connections in a broadly defined Malay 
World since the ethnic groups within the Malay race are scattered throughout the 
vast region of Southeast Asia, and even to Africa (Madagascar and South Africa) 
and South America (Surinam). However, this discussion is concentrated on Malaysia 
and Indonesia, studying the evolving roles of serumpun sentiment in shaping their 
interactions in response to both domestic and international developments, because 
they are the most important countries in the Malay World and their relations are the 
most salient serumpun relations. 
This paper analyses the historical factors that give meaning to the serumpun concept. It 
argues that the feeling of serumpun reached its height during the era of the former Prime 
Minster of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein (Razak) and the former Indonesian 
President, Suharto, especially after the racial riots of May 13, 1969 which pitted the 
Malays against the Chinese in Malaysia. In the post-Cold War era, there have emerged 
significant differences in the perception of serumpun due to the ‘generational gap’ and 
the new social, economic and political realities in both countries. 
The sentiment of serumpun can strengthen diplomatic relationships, but it can also be 
counterproductive. It is suggested that the serumpun concept can still remain as the 
basis for a ‘special relationship’ between the two countries, however new pillars must 
be built in order to strengthen and complement the existing relations. The economy 
and trade are two such areas where co-operation could be intensified to give more 
substance to the serumpun concept. 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first and second sections explain the origin 
of the Malays in Malaysia and Indonesia, and the historical context that led to the 
development of the serumpun concept. The third and fourth discuss the serumpun 
concept after both Malaysia and Indonesia gained their independence, and analyse its 
popularity during the Razak and Suharto era. The fifth section discusses the serumpun 
in the post-Cold War era, at a time when significant perceptional changes developed 
between the two countries. 
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THE MALAYS IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA:  
A CONCEPTUAL MAPPING
The term ‘race’ is a Latin word which generally refers to a group of common origin. 
In 1795 the German scientist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach suggested that the concept 
of bangsa Melayu (or a Malay race) should constitute a subcategory of the Mongoloid 
race. In further defining the Malays, the Malaysian government used Blumenbach’s 
concept of the Malay race. Indonesia in turn determined that they also belong to the 
Malay race. Historical sources suggest that groups of people who eventually became 
‘Malays’ migrated from Taiwan or eastern China in 4000-3000 BC to Luzon or other 
Philippine islands, prior to moving further afield in 2500-1500 BC to Borneo, Sulawesi 
and Java. Finally, in 1500 to 500 BC, they moved to Sumatera, Peninsular Malaysia 
and southern Vietnam (Andaya, 2004). The view of the Malays which was held by 
Stamford Raffles, the founder of modern day Singapore, had a profound influence on 
the Westerners. Stamford Raffles and Dr. John Leyden, a learned Scottish surgeon 
who became a good friend of Raffles when the latter was an Assistant Secretary to 
the Governor of Penang in 1805, were probably the most influential voices in 
the promotion of the idea of ‘Malay race’ or ‘nation’, which they argued was not 
limited to the Malay ethnic group, but embraced all the peoples of the Malay World 
(Reid, 2004).  
Ethnicity can generally be defined as constituting the common consciousness of being 
from the same origin and traditions. The English term ‘ethnic’ is derived from the 
Greek word ethniKos, meaning tribe or nation. An ethnic group acquires its distinctive 
cultural characteristics from interaction with outsiders, rather than in isolation (Ali, 
1984).  In this paper, when ‘ethnic group’ is mentioned, it means: 
Those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of 
their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded 
by others and that members of each group are often … united 
by emotional bonds and concerned with preservation of their  
type … they speak the same language … (and) share common cultural heritage 
(Ali, 1984, p. 13). 
In terms of the relationship between ethnicity and race, just like the ethnic Serbs and 
Croats are from the same Slavic race, in Malaysia and Indonesia the ethnic Acehnese, 
Bugis, Javanese, Madurese, Minangkabau and Sundanese stem from the Malay racial 
group. A broad understanding of ethnicity would suggest that ‘ethnicity is culture’. 
In the post-Cold War era, Huntington (1993) has warned that, “(t)he great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be culture” (p. 22). Most 
scholars of international relations agree that Huntington has succeeded in opening the 
debate centred on cultural explanations of cooperation and conflict which has been 
neglected by the political philosophies of neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Shulman, 
1998). The concern about culture is also echoed by the constructivists, who believe 
that in the study of International Relations, a greater emphasis should be given to the 
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aspects of culture and ethnicity. With this in mind, this paper endeavours to understand 
the complexity of culture and ethnicity in Malaysia and Indonesia through an analysis 
of serumpun relations. 
In the Malaysian Constitution, the definition of ‘Malay’ is essentially a cultural one. 
It refers to someone who follows the adat (customary law) of the Malays, speaks 
Malay and professes the religion of Islam (Milner, 2004). In effect, the Malaysian 
Constitution defines the ethnic boundaries of the Malays, so that these would not be 
questioned by the non-Malays especially the Chinese and Indians. The special rights 
and privileges of the Malays (and other indigenous Malaysians) are enshrined in the 
Constitution and entrenched in government policies. The Malays are the bumiputera 
(sons of the soil), together with other indigenous Malaysians such as the Senoi, Jakun 
and Semai in Peninsular Malaysia, Dayaks in Sarawak and Kadazan-Dusun in Sabah. 
The Malaysian government’s identification of the Malays is based on bangsa Melayu. 
As a result of this, while the Malays in Malaysia can be the descendants of ethnic 
Acehnese, Bugis, Javanese, Madurese and Minangkabau peoples, they are reluctant to 
differentiate themselves in this way, for doing so would be detrimental to their political 
unity given the presence of non-Malay groups. On the theme of bangsa Melayu and its 
evolving cultural identity, a Malay nationalist, Ibrahim Yaacob, has stated that:
There is no other Bangsa in this world which has extended culture on a vast 
scale for the whole race at the same time and pace as the Bangsa Melayu. 
The bangsa Melayu has absorbed three cultures one after another, which 
has fulfilled the character and soul in the descent of the Bangsa Melayu, 
that is, Hindu culture for thousands of years and for a thousand years the 
soul and blood of the Bangsa Melayu flowed with Buddhist culture. From 
the eleventh century A.D., Islamic culture has replaced these two cultures 
and flourished in splendour and glory with the light of God that is pure in 
the soul of the Bangsa Melayu as a whole (Liow, 2005, p. 46).
The fluidity of the definition of ‘Malay’ in Malaysia can be found in the term masuk 
Melayu (or to ‘enter Malayness’ or to become a Malay). This means that non-Malays 
can become ‘Malay’ through conversion to Islam on their free will or after marriage to 
a Malay. In fact the off-spring of non-Malays, or those from mix-marriages who have 
converted to Islam are automatically known as Melayu or Malays.  
Indonesians have generally accepted the notion that they are part of the Malay race. 
The Indonesian Constitution, however, does not mention anything about the definition 
of a Malay, nor does it differentiate between ethnic groups. Nonetheless, Indonesia 
accepts that a separation based on different languages, histories, cultures and religions 
does exist between the people in East Indonesia, especially Nusa Tenggara and Irian 
Jaya, who constitute populations from the Melanesian group, and the people in the 
rest of Indonesia who are from the Austronesian group. Sensitivity to national unity 
was echoed by D. F. Anwar (personal communication, August 26, 2006) who pointed 
out that, “Indonesia cannot afford to place an emphasis on the Malay race, because it 
is detrimental to national unity. People in Nusa Tenggara and Irian Jaya are different 
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because they are from the Melanesian group”.  Indeed, Indonesia has more than 1,000 
ethnic groups, of which 15 have at least one million people. Among these 15 ethnic 
groups are the Achenese, Buginese, Javanese, Madurese, Malays, Minangkabau and 
Sundanese. The founding fathers of modern Indonesia, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, 
realized the challenge of maintaining national unity amongst the vast array of ethnic 
groups. Thus, they created the national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or ‘Unity in 
Diversity.’ The national motto was inscribed in the national symbol of Indonesia of 
Garuda Pancasila and specifically mentioned in the Indonesian Constitution under 
Article 36A. The significance of the national motto was the fact that it was quoted 
from a Javanese poem Kakawin Sutasoma, written by Mpu Tantular dating back to the 
fifteenth century Kingdom of Majapahit which promoted tolerance between different 
ethnic and religious groups. The national ideology of Pancasila was also crafted to 
ensure harmony among the Indonesian people. In fact the Indonesia’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics (BPS) was not allowed by the Sukarno and Suharto administrations to 
include the question on the makeup of ethnicity in Indonesia in order to maintain 
unity and harmony. However, the Indonesian population census of 2000 collected by 
the BPS after the downfall of Sunarto clearly identified people based on their ethnic 
background where the Javanese constitute the largest ethnic group or 42 percent of 
the total population, followed by the Sundanese, 15 percent (Chalmers, 2006). Over 
the years, ethnic consciousness became more visible in Indonesia. According to 
Suryadinata (2002) “In reality, Indonesians have always been conscious of ethnicity. 
Because of the fear of ‘national disintegration’, the Indonesian Government in the last 
fifty years had never identified ethnic affiliation in its population census” (p. 2). This 
was due to the growing influence of ethnic Javanese on the Indonesian politics. At 
the same time, more preferences and opportunities were given to the ethnic Javanese 
at the expense of other ethnic groups in the granting of positions in the government 
administration, the military and education. Suryadinata (2002) stated that:
The thirty-two-years rule of Suharto re-established the perception of 
Javanese control over the non-Javanese. His ruling style, which was similar 
to the king of Java and his promotion of Javanese traditions and customs, 
perpetuated the concept of Indonesia being ruled by the people of Java. 
According to some observers, Suharto also tended to employ Javanese as 
well as non-Javanese who had married Javanese in high positions in his 
government. Because of the Javanese domination, Indonesian politics can 
be seen as a contest for power between the Javanese and non-Javanese. 
This notion often leads political analysts to focus on the study of the 
ethnic Javanese to understand Indonesian politics (p. 4). 
Ethnic consciousness eroded the bond between the Javanese and other Indonesians 
and weakened their attachment to the wider concept of the ‘Malay race’. 
SERUMPUN: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The relationship between the sovereign states of Indonesia and Malaysia formally 
began in August 1957. However, relationships between the two peoples have existed 
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for thousands of years. In order to understand the closeness of the relationships, and the 
feeling of being serumpun, it is important to look at four factors; first, the perception 
of ‘one entity’; second, the existence of a common ancient glory; third, inter-migration 
between the islands; and finally, the common struggle against colonialism. 
Malaysia-Indonesia Seen Since Ancient Times as One Entity
Since ancient times, Malaysia and Indonesia had been seen by many outsiders 
essentially as one entity. Ptolemy, the Egyptian geographer of the second century 
(AD), called this region the ‘Golden Chersonese’ because it was known for its gold 
deposits. The Indians also called the land mass which now comprises Malaysia and 
Indonesia as Golden Islands (Yavadvipa). The Arab geographer, Edrisi identified the 
region as ‘Malai’ which was rich in gold and spices. The Chinese Ming dynasty, which 
sent an emissary to the area in the fifteenth century under Admiral Zhenghe (Cheng Ho, 
1371-1435) called the area Southern Seas  (Nanyang) (Andaya & Andaya, 2001).  In 
the early years of Islam, the people who lived in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where Muslims 
performed their hajj, referred to the pilgrims who came from today’s Malaysia and 
Indonesia as Jawi, which literally means ‘people from Java’. Subsequently, the early 
European travelers called the area the Malay Archipelago. 
Under the Srivijaya Empire the Malay Archipelago was united as one political entity. 
At the height of its power, under Sang Dapunta Hayang, it occupied all the islands of 
Sumatera, Java, Peninsular Malaysia, Kalimantan, Nusa Tengarra, Maluku and even 
Mindanao (Supangkat 2005). In 1000 AD, texts by Arab merchants and traders bound 
for China made reference to travelling through ‘the sea of Melayu’. Even inscriptions 
found in the Indian Colamandala kingdom (South India) mention an ancient kingdom 
of Malaiyur (Melayu). However, in 1275, the capital of the Srivijaya Empire near 
Palembang, Sumatera and all its dependencies in Sumatera and Peninsular Malaysia 
were attacked and occupied by the powerful Majapahit from Java. Under the ruler 
Hayam Wuruk (1350-1389), and chief minister Gajah Mada, Majapahit expanded its 
empire to include the whole Archipelago. According to the epic poem Desawarnana 
(or generally known as Negarakrtagama), composed by the court poet Mpu Prapanca in 
1365, the Majapahit Empire encompassed an area from ‘the western tip of Sumatera to 
the southern Philippines and east to New Guinea’ (Brown, 2003). The Negarakrtagama 
also mentioned several states in mainland Asia that were under the protection of the 
Majapahit Empire. Under the Majapahit Empire the whole Archipelago was united 
again as one political entity. 
Moreover, the Malay language was spoken throughout the Malay Archipelago, as it 
was the important language of trade under the great empires of Srivijaya, Majapahit 
and Malacca. This continued even when the Malay Archipelago was under the 
colonization of the Portuguese, Dutch and British. For centuries, the Malay language 
has been the lingua-franca used by local and foreign merchants and traders in the 
area (Sutherland, 2004), and to some extent, it has united the people in the Malay 
Archipelago. Today, the Malay language is the national language in Malaysia, 
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Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and it is one of the official languages of Singapore. 
Even within the Malay communities of southern Thailand and the Philippines, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and South Africa, the Malay language is still being 
used in daily life. According to statistics on the usage of the Malay language across 
the globe, there are about 300 million people who speak it. In fact, it is the fourth most 
spoken language in the world, after Mandarin, English and Hindi. In early 2004, the 
Literary and Language Agency, Malaysia (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Malaysia) 
and the Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia Language Council (Majlis Bahasa Brunei, 
Indonesia and Malaysia) suggested that ASEAN formally adopt the Malay language 
as more than half of the ASEAN people are able to speak it. The above discussion 
demonstrates that, many people have seen this region as one geographical entity; and 
the people and traders who lived in this region spoke the Malay language. Both factors 
form the foundation of the serumpun concept. 
Shared Perception of Ancient Glory and Social Heritage
Among Malaysians and Indonesians, the ancient empires of Buddhist Srivijaya (683-
1377AD), Hindu Mataram (732-929AD), Hindu-Javanese Majapahit (1293-1525AD), 
and Islamic Malacca (1402-1511AD) are well known. They are recognised as the 
greatest achievements of their common ancestors, although Malaysians now tend to 
refer to the glory of Srivijaya and Malacca Empires, and Indonesians to the Majapahit 
and Mataram Empires, since Srivijaya and Malacca are seen as ‘Malay empires’ while 
the Majapahit and Mataram as ‘Javanese empires’. Many Malaysians still respect the 
spirit of the social covenant made by the ruler Seri Teri Buana, and his chief minister 
Demang Lebar Daun, at Bukit Siguntang, Palembang, Indonesia, the capital of the 
early Srivijaya Empire (Andaya & Andaya 2001). This covenant decreed that the 
Malays show obedience and loyalty to their royal rulers. In return, these rulers would 
repay them by being just and act as ‘protector’. Later, an exiled Hindu prince from 
Palembang known as Sri Parameswara, established a thriving port and an important 
state mid-way between India and China known as Malacca, now a state in Malaysia. 
Malacca grew to be an important empire in the 15th century, and a centre of Malay-
Muslim civilization. The famous Malay admiral, Hang Tuah, was born on the island 
of Bintan (now in the province of Riau, Indonesia) and moved to Malacca with his 
parents when he was a child. In contemporary times, many roads and hotels in both 
Malaysia and Indonesia are named after Hang Tuah, and both nations now claim Hang 
Tuah as their hero. After the fall of the Malacca Empire, Riau became the centre of 
Malay-Muslim civilization. Raja Haji (1809-1870) of the Johor-Riau sultanate, was 
regarded by Malaysians and Indonesians as a religious scholar and a grammarian for 
the Malaysian and Indonesian languages. Johor is now a state in Malaysia and Riau a 
province of Indonesia. 
During the struggle for independence, the shared perception of ancient glory and 
heritage was promoted by leaders who were enthusiastic about uniting Malaya and 
Indonesia into a single country. In mid-1945, Indonesia was given by the Japanese, 
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whose rule in the region was coming to an end, the opportunity to prepare for 
independence. A committee called the Investigating Body for the Preparation of 
Indonesia’s Independence (BPUPKI) was established. Both Muhammad Yamin 
(Yamin) and Sukarno were on the Committee. One of the duties of the Committee 
was to formulate the constitution, develop the political structure, and clarify the 
boundaries of the newly independent country. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung (1973) 
explained that the Committee took a vote on 10 July 1945 where a two thirds majority 
accepted the argument made by Yamin and Sukarno that the geographical boundary 
of an independent Indonesia should include the entire former Netherlands East Indies, 
Malaya, and the British Borneo colonies. Yamin declared that these territories were 
part of the former Majapahit Empire, as recorded in the Nagarakrtagama (Reinhardt, 
1967). Yamin was known to be the chief proponent of the idea of Greater Indonesia 
(Indonesia Raya). A former Vice President of Indonesia, Muhammad Hatta (Hatta), 
who was also involved in the Committee, suggested that an independent Indonesia 
should include Malaya and Singapore, but exclude West New Guinea (Irian Jaya). Prior 
to Sukarno and Hatta returning from their meetings with the Japanese Commander-
in-Chief for Southeast Asia, Marshal Terauchi in Dalat, Vietnam, there was a plan 
for them to meet the Malayan leaders to discuss the possibility of the inclusion of 
Malaya and Singapore in an independent Indonesia (Wanandi, 1988). The meeting 
between Sukarno and Hatta and the Malayan leaders Ibrahim Yaacob (the founder 
of the first political group in Malaya, the Young Malays Union or Kesatuan Melayu 
Muda) and Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (one of the leaders of Malay Nationalist Party 
and later President of Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, or PIMP) took place in Taiping, 
Malaya. Both sides signed an agreement with full consent of the Japanese authority to 
unite Malaya with Indonesia as a single independent country under the term Greater 
Indonesia (Abdul Hamid, 2007). However, the aspiration of these early nationalist 
leaders to unite the entire archipelago was dashed with the imminent defeat of the 
Japanese. Sukarno and Hatta hastily proclaimed Indonesia’s independence, minus 
the inclusion of Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo, on 17 August 1945 
(Poulgrain, 1998). 
General Abdul Haris Nasution (Nasution), who fought during the Revolution and was 
later appointed the first Indonesian Army Chief, also emphasized the common history 
and ancestral (and political) unity of the Malay Archipelago. It is important to note that 
Nasution, Hatta and Yamin were of Sumatran origin, and so felt closer to the ethnic 
Malays in Malaya than did Sukarno, who was from Java. In his five volume work 
entitled Around the War of Indonesian Independence (Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia) Nasution acknowledged the contribution made by the Malay nationalists 
(especially from the Malay Nationalist Party) during the Indonesian struggle for 
independence, mentioning that they fought in combat against the Dutch army, side by 
side with their Indonesian brothers. It was estimated that the Malay Nationalist Party, 
which was formed in mid-October 1945, had 150,000 members, of which 60,000 
members were Indonesians. Further to this, the first president of the Party was Java-
born Moktar U’d-din (Poulgrain, 1998). The party’s platform was that Malaya should 
be part of Greater Indonesia. 
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Common Struggle against Colonialism 
Indigenous Malays’ struggle against colonialism was indeed a major factor that 
contributed to the development of serumpun, and the comradely spirit started well 
before the Pacific War and its aftermath as described above. Since the early 1900s, 
there were many instances where nationalists and intellectuals from both British 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies worked together to educate and mobilize the 
masses in anti-colonial struggles. In 1906, the most influential Islamic journal Al-
Islam collectively addressed its readers in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies as 
‘our community’ and spoke of ‘our religion’. The Malayan and Indonesian students 
who studied overseas often tried to establish common unity among them. In 1925, the 
Malayan and Indonesian students who studied in the Egyptian Al Azhar University 
published a journal called Seruan Azhar. Abdullah (1993) explained that in its first 
issue, the editor claimed that “All our people … whether in Java, or in Sumatra, or 
in Borneo, or in the Malay Peninsular, must unite and share a common purpose and 
agreement to strive for advancement …, and on no account allow ourselves to split 
into separate parties” (p. 144). Malayan and Indonesian students in Iraq formed the 
National Council of Indonesia-Malaya (Majlis Kebangsaan Indonesia-Malaya). This 
council later changed its name to the Convention of Indonesia Youth (Perkumpulan 
Pemuda Indonesia) when the Malaya students agreed to be represented as Indonesians 
(Abdullah, 1993). Similarly, in India and Sri Lanka, the Malayan and Indonesian 
students formed the Indonesia-Malaya Society (Persatuan Indonesia-Malaya) and the 
Welfare Organization of Indonesia and the Peninsula (Kesejahteraan Rakyat Indonesia 
Semenanjung). All these organizations demonstrate that there was an intentional effort 
to create a sense of unity among the elites and young leaders in overseas institutions. 
Meanwhile, many local students at colleges and members of political and social 
organizations in both nations openly support the integration of Malaya and Indonesia. 
For example, in the 1930s and 1950s, many former students from the Sultan Idris 
Teachers College (now the Sultan Idris University of Education) in Malaya became 
involved in the radical nationalist movement through organizations such as the Young 
Malays Union (KMM), Malayan Nationalist Party, PUTERA and KRIS. The leaders 
of these parties, such as Ibrahim Yaacob, Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and Ahmad 
Boestamam, were known to openly promote the concept of serumpun and support 
the integration of Malaya and Indonesia. KMM also openly declared its struggle 
towards “political salvation for the Malays by means of expulsion of the British 
and the union of Malaya with a yet to be formed independent Indonesia” (Poulgrain 
1998, p. 28). The radical and revolutionary nature of KMM often drew immigrants 
from Indonesia into its ranks. At the same time, many Malayan scholars, writers 
and literary enthusiasts considered Indonesia to be a source of inspiration and the 
Indonesians as blood relatives (saudara dari seberang) from across the ocean. So 
there had been deliberate attempts on both sides to instill in the people of Malaya and 
Indonesia a sense of fraternity. These attempts contributed to the strong notion of being 
serumpun among the population in the lead up to Independence, culminating in the 
deal of Greater Indonesia among Sukarno, Hatta, Ibrahim Yaacob and Burhanuddin 
Al-Helmy in 1945. 
20                             Proceedings of the Second on National Resilience (SNAR II)
Inter-Migration: Push and Pull Factors
The migration of people from Indonesia to Malaysia (and vice versa) is the single most 
important factor that created the feeling of being serumpun. Movement of people in 
this area has been occurring since ancient times, although the numbers and directions 
have often fluctuated. Basic similarities in culture, language and religion have made 
the inter-migration and assimilation process relatively simple. 
Before the arrival of the colonial powers and the formation of international boundaries 
in the region, the Malays from all parts of the archipelago, especially the Acehnese, 
Buginese, Banjarese, Javanese and Minangkabau, roamed and settled as they wished. 
Migration between what are now the Malaysian and Indonesian territories often resulted 
from a variety of push and pull factors. For instance, the rise and fall of kingdoms, 
especially in what is now Indonesia, often saw the migration of people to Malaya. 
The fall of the Srivijaya kingdom to the Majapahit resulted in the establishment of 
Malacca by Parameswara, an exiled prince from Srivijaya, with his entourage. With 
the arrival and influence of many Arabs and Indian Muslim traders in Malacca, the 
ruler and his subjects became Muslims. At its height, Malacca was to become the 
most important trading port in the region. When Malacca fell to the Portuguese in 
1511, and later to the Dutch in 1641, the migration flow from Indonesia continued to 
other parts of Malaya and Borneo. At the same time, as the Indonesians sought land 
and fortune, they also established the new sultanate kingdoms of Selangor, Johor-Riau 
and Negeri Sembilan. Based on the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the Malay World 
was divided into two spheres of influence namely; Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and 
North Borneo under the British influence, and the rest of the Malay World under Dutch 
control (Milne & Mauzy, 1986). However, migration flow from the Dutch territory of 
Netherlands East Indies (especially from Sumatra and Java) to Malaya and Borneo 
continued due to opposition to the oppressive Cultivation System imposed by the 
Dutch. The Cultivation System forced Indonesians to set aside one-fifth of their paddy 
fields for the production of cash crops (such as coffee, tobacco, sugar, indigo and tea) 
which were exported to the European market (Brown, 2003). This system resulted in 
many incidents of rebellion, famine and starvation, and it led thousands of Indonesians 
to flee to the British colonies.
In terms of pull factors, the British actually encouraged the migration of Indonesians 
to the British colonies in the late 19th century. The rationale behind this was that these 
new arrivals would open new areas and become workers on plantations, especially the 
rubber estates. As a result, a large part of western Johor, Perak and Selangor states in 
Malaysia have been settled by the Javanese, who work in the coffee, pineapple and 
rubber sectors. In Negeri Sembilan and Pahang states in Malaysia, the Minangkabau 
and the Bugis respectively settled there. Most worked on rubber plantations or as paddy 
planters. The Minangkabaus still strictly follow their matrilineal system, known as 
Adat Perpatih, as they also do in West Sumatra. After Independence, especially under 
the Prime Minister Razak, Indonesians were encouraged to settle in Malaysia on the 
grounds that the Malaysian population was still relatively small, and large areas needed 
manpower for plantation development. At the same time, due to political reasons, 
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it was hoped that the Indonesians, who are similar to Malays in culture, traditions 
and religion, would bolster the number of the so-called ‘indigenous people’ vis-a-vis 
the non-Malays. During the Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Mahathir) administration, 
Indonesian workers were also welcomed as Malaysia, during the economic boom in 
the late 1980s, faced labour shortages in the electronic, construction and plantation 
sectors. A significant number of these Indonesians later settled in Malaysia, becoming 
permanent residents or citizens. What is important here is that the history and continuous 
inter-migration of people has strengthened the concept of serumpun between Malaysia 
and Indonesia.
THE SERUMPUN CONCEPT AFTER INDEPENDENCE: TWO 
SOVEREIGN STATES AND DIVERGING INTERESTS
The sentiment and practice of serumpun embarked on a very complicated and mixed 
trajectory after Indonesia and Malaya achieved independence - separately. While it 
did not  create total harmony between the two sovereign states and could not even 
guarantee Indonesia’s domestic unity, serumpun did help maintain an emotional bond 
which the two governments could capitalize on in constructing a special state-to-state 
relationship, tackling crises and rebuilding connections when broad geopolitical and 
national circumstances did not pose direct obstacles. To some extent such mixed but 
overall positive functions of ‘common race’ was not unique to Malaysia and Indonesia, 
since it was also witnessed, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees, in the cases 
of the two Koreas, two Chinas, and two Germanys. 
With the arrival of independence in August 1957 Malaya attempted to exercise 
its newly found liberty to determine its own foreign policy direction. Some of the 
measures taken by Malaya were not supportive of, and were perhaps even detrimental 
to, Indonesia’s national interests including its security concerns. The first blow to 
bilateral relations occurred in December 1957 when Malaya took a neutral stand at 
the UN General Assembly’s voting on the issue of Dutch West New Guinea. This 
dismayed the Sukarno government as it was hoping that Kuala Lumpur would vote 
in its favour, not anticipating that Indonesia’s ‘blood relatives’ could not be counted 
on when in need. Jakarta’s disappointment was echoed in the Indonesian Observer 
newspaper:
All is well if only the Indonesian government would realize that Malaya, 
although similar in many respects to Indonesia, has her own interests 
in her struggle for survival. We should have refrained from too much 
enthusiasm when Malaya received her independence (Muniandy,  
1996, p. 77).
Malaya took a neutral stand on the West New Guinea issue because it had just gained 
independence and wanted more time to consider the issue. Nevertheless, Malaya finally 
gave its support to Indonesia after recognising the strong desire for decolonization 
among the international community. However, further problems arose in February 
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1958. As if to show that serumpun was no guarantee for Indonesia’s own national unity, 
a rebellion was staged by the Indonesian Revolutionary Government (PRRI) army in 
Padang, Sumatra, against the Sukarno government (Reinhardt, 1967). The PRRI army 
was supported by Colonel Simbolon in Tapanuli, North Sulawesi, who also staged his 
own rebellion under Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Permesta). These insurgent 
groups (PRRI/Permesta) claimed that they wanted an independent Sumatra and 
Sulawesi because they were dissatisfied with their unequal economic development, and 
disillusioned with the central government in Jakarta. Doeppers (1972) explained that 
the former US Ambassador to Indonesia during the PRRI rebellion, Howard P. Jones 
had reported to Washington that “Hatta, Chief of Staff Nasution, and other influential 
Indonesians in Djakarta saw the rebellion not as a struggle centered on ‘communism’ 
but rather as distressing attempt to break up the Indonesian state” (p. 195). In a further 
twist of the serumpun spirit in the age of sovereign states when ethnic groups had their 
collective interests closely related to their position in the shifting politics of sovereign 
states, the respected Sultan of Deli in Sumatra stated:
We Sumatrans would do better to leave the republic (of Indonesia) 
altogether and join Malaya. Most of the Sultans there are relatives of 
mine, and one really has so much more in common (compared with the 
Javanese) (Poulgrain, 1998, p. 174).
Indonesia accused Malaya and Britain of directly aiding insurgent groups, partly 
because the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (Tunku) gave a serious 
consideration to the idea of Sumatra joining Malaya to form a ‘Greater Malaya’ 
(Poulgrain, 1998). Commanded by Nasution, the Indonesian army brutally crushed 
the insurgent groups in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The remaining PRRI leaders fled to 
Malaya. The Sukarno government wanted Tunku to send them back to be tried in 
Indonesia, but Malaya refused the request and granted the insurgent leaders political 
asylum. Malaya’s action seemed to further vindicate Indonesia’s accusation that 
Malaya was assisting the PRRI in terms of providing arms, sanctuary and propaganda 
(Anwar, 1994). While these incidents soured bilateral relations, the ultimate break 
down took place later in 1963 when Sukarno explicitly announced Indonesia’s hostility 
to the idea of ‘Malaysia’. Malaysia was proposed by Tunku with the intention to unite 
Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and British North Borneo. Milner (2006) stated 
that Malaysia was often translated as ‘Melayu Raya’ or ‘Greater Malaydom’. Although 
Sukarno’s Confrontation campaign to crush the newly formed country led to the 
suspension of diplomatic relations, significantly the racial bond and common struggle 
against colonialism were still invoked by both sides. For example, in September 1964, 
in a speech at the United Nations Security Council hearing of Malaysia’s complaint of 
the Indonesian military incursion onto its territory, the Malaysian Minister for Home 
Affairs and Justice, Ismail Abdul Rahman, made the following remarks: 
When the Indonesian people fought for independence from the 
Netherlands, not only did we in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak 
give them material and moral support, but hundreds of Malayans and 
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those from Sabah and Sarawak and Singapore went over to Indonesia 
to join their brethren and to fight side by side with them. Some of them 
laid down their lives for them, and many more settled down in Indonesia, 
becoming Indonesian citizens. In those days and thereafter, Indonesian 
leadership was a source of inspiration and guidance to us (Ministry of 
External Affairs, Malaysia, 1964, p. 2).
At the same hearing, the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, 
expressed similar sentiment and conjured up the cultural and racial oneness:
 
I, for one, regret that we should oppose each other here in this world 
body, since our two peoples are so close, racially as well as culturally, 
and indeed we can be called brothers within the same family, the family 
of the great Malay race. We speak the same language, possess the same 
cultural heritage, and inhabit the same home area in South East Asia 
(Ministry of External Affairs, Malaysia, 1964, p. 8). 
It did not take long to see that while the idea of serumpun failed to prevent a few 
years of animosity, it could be used to improve relations and underpin friendship when 
other circumstances became right. In his attempt to normalize relations with Malaysia 
after he replaced Sukarno, Suharto’s appointed Adam Malik as Foreign Minister and 
Indonesian delegation leader to Malaysia. This was well calculated, since Adam Malik 
was known to have many maternal relatives and friends in Perak, Malaysia. His mother, 
Hajjah Siti Salmah, was born in Cemor, Perak, but later moved to Pematangsiantar, 
North Sumatera, with her Indonesian husband. This is where Adam Malik was born 
(Djamily 1980). Adam Malik’s story is another example of inter-migration between 
both countries which served to strengthen serumpun. Adam Malik declared that, “it 
(the peace agreement to end the Confrontation) is a victory for the Malay race. There 
is no winner and there is no loser” (Kadir, 1991, p. 42). 
It was true that Prime Minister Tunku was cautious about the resumption of bilateral 
relations. He suspected that “if [Indonesia] stuck to the present system of centralized 
rule by the Javanese, there could be no future peace or stability and this presented 
considerable dangers for Malaysia” (Liow, 2005, p. 329). However, with the signing 
of the Bangkok Accords to end the Confrontation and the formation of ASEAN in 
1967, Tunku began to change his position and made an official visit to Jakarta in 
March 1968. As a goodwill gesture, Tunku made a public call to all ASEAN members 
to provide assistance to the Suharto government in its effort to rebuild the national 
economy which was devastated during the ‘year of living dangerously’ under Sukarno 
in 1965. Meaningfully he also proclaimed:
Malaysians are blood brothers of the Indonesians. We are few in number. 
I sometimes wonder whether the Malays would have come into being if it 
had not been for the Indonesians. Thanks to Allah, Confrontation is over. 
It was not Indonesians confronting Malays, but communists opposing 
non-communists (Liow, 2005, p. 113).
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Therefore, after all Tunku still believed the serumpun concept was critical factor in 
advancing bilateral relations. During his visit to Jakarta, both countries agreed to 
revive the 1959 ‘Treaty of Friendship’ which was declared void during Confrontation 
(Muniandy, 1996). Suharto’s visit to Malaysia in March 1970 was the first by an 
Indonesian head of state. At a dinner in his honour, Suharto spoke about how, since 
his arrival in Malaysia, he had felt like he was with his own family, and not in a 
foreign country. He added that Malaysians and Indonesians were both neighbours 
and saudara (or relatives), sharing similar interests, problems and ways of thinking 
(Muniandy, 1996). Liow (2003) rightly pointed out that one significant point to note 
about both leaders’ visits was that “the language of blood brotherhood (serumpun) 
was employed liberally” (p. 334). The sentiment of serumpun, a traditional fabric in 
bilateral relations, definitely facilitated their post-Confrontation reconciliation.
STRENGTHENING THE SERUMPUN CONCEPT SINCE RAZAK
The May 1969 racial riots in Malaysia worked as a major catalyst for the development 
of serumpun solidarity. The country’s Deputy Prime Minister at that time, Razak led 
the post-riots governing regime, a National Operations Council (NOC), the first task 
of which was to restore law and order. It tightened the rules regarding the publication 
of material which might inflame racial tensions, such as Mahathir’s book, The Malay 
Dilemma. On the other hand, the NOC amended the sedition laws to prohibit any 
public discussion of issues such as “(a) the status and powers of the Malay Rulers, 
(b) the special position of the Malays and the citizenship rights of non-Malays, (c) 
the status of Islam as the official religion, and (d) the status of Malay as the sole 
official national language” (Hng Hung Yong, 2004, p. 104). In this light, Razak saw 
the serumpun Indonesians as a bulwark against ethnic Chinese pressure in Malaysia. 
The May 1969 racial riots evoked feelings of sympathy amongst Indonesians for 
their ‘blood relatives’ in Malaysia. Many Malay students were known to have visited 
Jakarta to learn about the tactics used by the Indonesian students during the 1965-
66 post-coup riots. Moreover, some political Islamic organizations in Malaysia had 
been working with their Indonesian counterparts to provoke further Malay resentment 
toward the Chinese (Liow, 2003). The riots were closely monitored by the Indonesian 
government, and meetings were convened at the cabinet level on the appropriate 
course of action that should be taken if needed. Suharto hinted that he was ready, 
if the situation worsened, to ‘help’ the Malays in Malaysia. Suharto’s close aide, 
General Tjokropranolo, claimed that “the Indonesian people as a whole felt they had 
an obligation to help the Malays in their ‘struggle’ with the Chinese” (Liow, 2003, 
p. 337). Therefore, the state visit by Suharto to Malaysia in March 1970, which took 
place just ten months after the riots and was marked by the use of the language of 
‘blood relatives’ and serumpun, was suspected by many Malaysian Chinese as part of 
a political conspiracy to oppress the Chinese (Muniandy, 1996). After all, the Suharto 
government itself was imposing a program of Indonesianization on the ethnic Chinese 
communities. The New Order regime forced the Indonesian Chinese to assimilate 
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into the ‘mainstream’ by closing Chinese medium schools, banning the Chinese from 
displaying their language characters and cultural performances, and requiring them 
to adopt Indonesian (usually Javanese) names (Klinken, 2003). The close relations 
between Malaysia and Indonesia also heightened concern in the Chinese dominated 
Singapore. The Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore at the time, Toh Chin Chye, 
opined that “Singapore had to watch that it was not squeezed between brother Malays” 
(Liow, 2005, p. 108). 
The most controversial program introduced by the government of Razak, who 
succeeded Tunku as Prime Minister in September 1970, was the New Economic Policy 
(NEP). Embodied in a series of five-year plans from 1971 to 1990, NEP sought to 
reduce and eliminate the identification of race with economic function (Verma, 2004). 
The specific goal of the NEP was to reduce the incidence of poverty in rural areas, 
where the majority of Malays and other indigenous people lived, and to increase their 
share of the nation’s wealth. The Malays and other indigenous groups (Bumiputera), 
who constituted 55 per cent of the total population in 1970, were given preference in 
higher education, job opportunities in government offices, and government contracts 
for businesses for the next 20 years. NEP was similar to Indonesia’s Banteng scheme 
of the 1950s which tried to provide greater economic opportunity and benefits to the 
indigenous Indonesians (pribumi) and assist them to compete with the ethnic Chinese 
(Klinken, 2003) Another similarity to Indonesia from the political development in 
post-riots Malaysia arose from a national ideology (Rukunegara) introduced by Razak. 
Somewhat akin to Indonesia’s Pancasila, it prescribed five guiding principles, namely 
belief in god, loyalty to king and country, the sanctity of the constitution, the rule of 
law, and good behaviour and morality (Andaya & Andaya, 2001). 
In foreign policy, Razak refocused Malaysia foreign policy from Tunku’s pro-
west and anti-communist stance, towards claims of non-alignment or neutrality. 
This policy was again similar to Indonesian foreign policy under Suharto which 
emphasized ‘independent and active’ policy as well as neutral stance. Razak conducted 
consultation (musyawarah) with Suharto under the spirit of serumpun on important 
issues that affected both countries’ national interests.  In education, Razak insisted on 
fast-tracking up the establishment of a National University of Malaysia (Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia), with the assistance from Indonesia. The new Malaysian 
Education Minister, Abdul Rahman Yaakub and his senior officers visited Jakarta 
to recruit teachers for the new university. Zainal Abidin Abdul Wahid, a member 
of the university advising committee commented that Indonesia provided assistance 
to the establishment of the Malaysian university based on a spirit of brotherhood or 
serumpun (Muniandy, 1996). Abdul Rahman Yaakub acknowledged that without the 
assistance of Indonesia, not only would the university not have been established, but 
also the implementation of the National Education Policy and the Malay language into 
schools and universities would have failed (Muniandy, 1996). Information and cultural 
cooperation was another important field in which relations between the two countries 
were strengthened. Institutionalized exchange of radio and television programs and 
films reinforced the sense of unity. In fact, the Malaysian government news agency 
Bernama opened its first overseas branch in Jakarta (Muniandy, 1996). 
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Serumpun reached its height with the Razak government. After the sudden death of 
Razak in January 1976, the new Prime Minister Hussein Onn (Hussein) maintained 
the momentum. Just two weeks after assuming office, Hussein made his first official 
visit to Jakarta. Liow (2005) commented that “It was at this visit that Indo-Malaysian 
‘brotherliness’ was re-affirmed by Suharto and Hussein” (p. 129). With Mahathir 
succeeding Hussein as Prime Minister in 1981, amicable relations continued. Malaysia 
recognized Indonesia’s Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara) through a treaty, 
and Indonesia recognized Malaysia’s existing rights, especially on communication, 
in the waters under its Archipelagic Outlook (Anwar, 1994). Serumpun spirit also 
translated into diplomatic solidarity on broader regional issues. As the situation 
in Cambodia was uncertain at this time, the Commander of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces, General Benny Moerdani, made a statement during the General Border 
Committee (GBC) meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1983 that Indonesia would 
provide military assistance to Malaysia if the country was attacked by foreign forces 
(Anwar, 1994). Benny Moerdani even specified that if Terumbu Layang Layang atoll 
which was recently occupied by Malaysia in the Spratly Islands (yet also claimed 
by Vietnam and China) was attacked, Indonesia would come to the assistance of 
Malaysia. General Moerdani stated that “when Malaysia is pinched, Indonesia feels 
the pain” (Anwar, 1994, p. 145). Despite Indonesia’s obvious strategic and security 
considerations relating to both issues, their support for Malaysia also showed that the 
spirit of serumpun brotherhood was very alive. 
SERUMPUN IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
During the Cold War, different interpretations of serumpun between the two sides were 
often swept under the carpet, or not formally discussed. This was intentional so as not 
to upset the cordial relations prevailing since Razak and Suharto which were useful 
to both the domestic agendas and diplomatic interests of the two states. However, 
since the late 1980s, the influence of serumpun in bilateral relations has become more 
ambiguous. Sure there were brotherly moments. In his speech at the Second Malaysia 
Indonesia Conference in September 1990, the then Malaysian Ambassador to Indonesia, 
Abdullah Zawawi, stated that “(i)n discussing the Malaysia-Indonesia relations, we 
cannot ignore the concept of serumpun which is often quoted as that special bond 
which characterizes the relationship between the two countries” (Mohamad, 1990, 
p. 1). It is also known that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (as Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minster) and Habibie (as Indonesian Vice President) attempted to strengthen the 
fraternity of Islam by basing it on the existing bond of serumpun through their own 
think tanks Institut Kajian Dasar and Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia. More 
significantly, due to Malaysia’s commitment to provide Indonesia with US$1 billion 
as part of a rescue package under IMF in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1997, 
Suharto praised Malaysia as a true serumpun brother. However, Malaysia withdrew 
the assistance later on the grounds that its own economy was also badly hit by the 
impact of the Asian financial crisis (Pereira, 1999). President Habibie also expressed 
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his appreciation of Malaysia’s various measures to help the Indonesian economy, 
describing the two countries as “one breath, one racial group (serumpun)”(Singh, 2000, 
p. 244). However, beyond all these sentimental expressions, the post-Cold War era has 
overall witnessed increasing challenges to serumpun as a driving force in relationship. 
Diverging perceptions have arisen from the increasingly evident different trajectories 
in domestic political economy, and this seems to have twisted the traditional spirit 
of serumpun and complicated the socio-political environment in which it functions. 
Also, the rise of Mahathir’s Malaysia as an economic and political star particularly 
in the developing world, effectively shattered the ‘older and younger brothers’ 
implication which was long imbedded in the harmonious practice of the serumpun 
idea. Furthermore, generational changes have posed the ultimate challenge to the 
continuation of the serumpun spirit. The younger generations did not have the same 
ideas of unity between Malaysia and Indonesia as did the generations who fought for 
independence. The following discussion examines these developments accordingly. 
The Serumpun Concept and the Diverging National Political Economies
It became clear during the 1990s that the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) leaders’ conviction to the serumpun concept was politically expedient as 
it could potentially be used as a tool to counter domestic pressure from non-Malay 
groups. With the end of the NEP policy in 1990, the non-Malays began pressuring 
the government for greater rights and opportunities, especially in education and the 
economy. Their demands at the time included firstly, a continuation of Chinese and 
Tamil schools with more funding from the government; secondly, the protection of 
their languages; thirdly, meritocracy of entrance to universities (rather than quota 
based); fourthly, the establishment of ‘University Merdeka’ for ethnic Chinese in 
response to the existence of the exclusive (i.e Malays only) Institute Technology 
Mara (now upgraded to University level); and finally, greater equity in the awarding 
of government tenders and projects. Malay politicians felt that by emphasizing the 
serumpun concept, they would have more leverage when dealing with the non-Malays. 
They tried to show that they had the ‘numbers’, not only in Malaysia, but also in 
Indonesia. The increasing number of Indonesians becoming permanent residents and 
gaining citizenship in Malaysia suited the same purpose. The Indonesian immigrants 
were perceived in early 1990s as Bangsa Serumpun who would eventually assimilate 
with the Bumiputera and strengthen the Malays’ electoral power vis-à-vis the non-
Malays (Abdullah, 1992). Abdul Mutalib (1999) explained that at one stage an 
estimated 20,000 illegal immigrants in the state of Sabah, mostly Indonesian and 
Filipino Muslims, were given Malaysian identity cards and registered as voters in order 
to offset the large number of indigenous Kadazan-Dusun (who professed Christianity) 
and the ethnic Chinese. He also added that these new comers often joined political 
parties associated with the National Front alliance parties, especially UMNO. In fact, 
many were elected as heads of UMNO branches, or even as representatives to the 
UMNO General Assembly, where they gave their votes to the candidates who would 
protect their interests. To some extent, these people strengthened UMNO’s political 
power, much to the dismay of the non-Malay political parties.
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However, cynical political manipulation to keep Malay privileges did not dovetail 
with the changing ethnic dimension of the Indonesian politics which was nonetheless 
divisive in its own way. The generation of multi-ethnic Indonesian leaders who held 
office during the Sukarno and early Suharto periods had a strong attachment to the 
serumpun concept and the notion of a greater Malay race. This changed when in 
later years Suharto began to give more preference to the ethnic Javanese, especially 
when awarding administrative and military posts. Suharto’s reliance on the Javanese 
people for political support did not change at all in the 1980s and early 1990s. Its 
only difference was on the shift of focus, from the abangan Javanese to relying more 
on the santri Javanese, especially the Javanese Muslim professionals with ICMI, to 
fill the military, administrative and bureaucratic positions. Furthermore, the Suharto‘s 
government’s transmigration program “… led dispersal of ‘Javanese’ people to far-
flung corners of this vast archipelago …is without question a political move aimed 
at strengthening the presence of Javanese political ‘centre’ in the nations’s margins” 
(Elmhirst, 2000, p. 488). The current Indonesian political elites, who are mostly ethnic 
Javanese, do not have a strong attachment to the serumpun concept. 
In contrast, Indonesians of non-Javanese descent and their political representatives 
living in Sumatra, Riau, Kalimantan and Sulawesi continued to have a strong 
attachment to the serumpun concept. The former Malaysian Ambassador to Indonesia 
and Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN, made the remarks that “when the former 
Malaysian Prime Ministers Razak or Mahathir went to Sumatra or Sulawesi, the people 
there considered them as Malay leaders. Suharto was not popular there, because the 
people considered him as a Javanese leader” (A. M. Selat, personal communication, 
September 8, 2006). Some politicians in Kuala Lumpur actually believed that exploiting 
the serumpun concept would provide political leverage when dealing with Jakarta on 
bilateral issues. This is because many Indonesians, especially those from the outer Java 
islands of Sumatra, Riau, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, retain a strong sentiment toward 
the Malay race, and to some degree felt closer to the Malays in Malaysia than they did 
toward the Javanese. For example, the Malays in Riau have regarded themselves to be 
closer to Kuala Lumpur than to Jakarta.  They have political and economic orientation 
towards Kuala Lumpur because of the geographical and communication distance from 
Jakarta. The link also gave the Malays in Riau an opportunity to regain their past glory 
and prestige under the Johor-Riau Empire (Lian Kwen Fee, 2002, p. 875-6).  
 
The serumpun spirit was also tested on the issue of Indonesian migrant workers, with 
very mixed result. In order to reduce an acute labour shortage in the 1990s, especially 
in the agricultural, plantation and construction sectors, Malaysia had to import workers 
from overseas. Indonesian workers were preferred due to several factors, such as cheap 
labour, less stringent labour laws in Indonesia, and of course serumpun brotherhood. 
Indonesian migrant workers became a valuable source of labour in rural areas, 
replacing young Malays who had moved to towns to work in the thriving electronic 
industries mostly set up by foreign investors. At the same time, thousands of illegal 
Indonesian immigrants also entered Malaysia seeking employment, especially after 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Unfortunately, the growing number of the serumpun 
people from Indonesia began creating problems in Malaysia, particularly in relation 
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to security concerns. For instance, some of the illegal immigrants were known to be 
involved in criminal activities such as smuggling drugs and fire arms, increasing the 
potentials of terrorist threat. From 1998, the Malaysian economy also began to feel the 
full effects of the deepening Asian financial crisis. As a result it started to repatriate 
thousands of Indonesian migrant workers, adding to Indonesia’s unemployment 
situation. Indonesia was furious, criticizing Malaysia for acting against the spirit of 
the serumpun concept.
Challenging the Mindset of ‘Older and Younger Brothers’
The notion of ‘older and younger brothers’ had been implied in the concept of the 
serumpun brotherhood long before Malaysia and Indonesia gained their independence. 
Indonesia’s struggle for independence against the Dutch since the 1920s, in particular 
by the communists and leftists under Tan Malaka’s leadership, and the imprisonment 
of many nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Hatta in the following years, inspired 
many Malays in Malaya. Indonesian books, especially those on the subjects of 
independence, nationalism and religion, were sought after by Malayan activists. To 
some extent Malay nationalists in Malaya joined their Indonesian comrades waging an 
armed struggle against the Dutch primarily because they wanted to gain independence 
alongside Indonesia under the so-called Greater Indonesia as elaborated upon before. 
When Indonesia finally gained independence from the Dutch, many Malayan leaders 
sought assistance from the Indonesians in their aspiration for independence. Thus, 
Indonesians came to be regarded by nationalist leaders in Malaya as their ‘older 
brothers’ who were obliged to help their serumpun brothers to achieve independence. 
Many Malayans of Indonesian origin and some leftist groups influenced by Indonesia 
were instrumental in the establishment of the Malay Nationalist Party, which received 
training from Indonesia on ways to more effectively mobilize the Malayan people to 
take up arms against the British. It is true that Indonesia eventually became skeptical of 
Malayan independence since it was granted through negotiations between the British 
and local leaders from aristocrat families like Tunku, without spilling any blood. These 
pro-western leaders allowed the British to maintain their large economic interest and 
military presence in Malaya. Nevertheless, in a display of goodwill, Indonesia became 
the first country to designate an ambassador to Malaya, even prior to it gaining official 
independence. 
The Confrontation campaign was viewed by scholars as a manifestation of Sukarno’s 
infuriation with Tunku who failed to consult him as an ‘older brother’ and leader of 
a powerful country in Southeast Asia on the proposed Federation of Malaysia. This 
was in fact literally how some leaders perceived the situation at the time – therefore, 
the former Singaporean Minister for Culture, Rajaratnam (1964) made the following 
statement:
I remember Dr. Subandrio (the former Indonesian Foreign Minister under 
Sukarno) complaining in the press some two years ago that Tunku Abdul 
Rahman had never, as a dutiful younger brother should, made a pilgrimage 
to Indonesia to sit at the feet of Bung Karno and gather such pearls of 
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wisdom as may be flung at the Tunku. Even today the Indonesian grouse 
is that Malaysia is being opposed simply because of our failure to consult 
big brother about it; to inform about our plans to federate the Malaysian 
territories (p. 19).
Malaysia saw Sukarno’s Indonesia not behaving as a helpful and intelligent ‘older 
brother’ should in making a young country feel free, secure and prosperous. At the end 
of Confrontation, an Indonesian Armed Forces daily stated:
There is much we can note to prove that Malaysia and Indonesia are in 
fact brothers – eggs of the same nest …. It is not only in the cultural field 
that Malaysia feels itself our younger brother, but in other fields as well. 
We should respond to this, not arrogantly but as an elder brother (Liow, 
2005, p. 165).
So the rhetoric of ‘older and younger brothers’ was maintained. During Suharto-Razak 
era, serumpun brotherhood reached its zenith, but as the ‘younger brother’ Malaysia 
had to consult Indonesia more often. In the early 1970s, Indonesia was hit hard by a 
series of natural disasters. Suharto immediately appealed to Malaysia for assistance, 
and his appeal was quickly met by Razak who sent 5,000 tons of rice. However, the 
then Malaysian Ambassador to Indonesia, Zainal Sulong, conveyed to Razak that our 
‘Indonesian brothers’ required 20,000 tons of rice and Malaysia had to do more. In 
response, Razak ordered another 15,000 tons of rice to be sent out. The Malaysian 
gesture was well received and appreciated by Suharto, who declared that “this was 
how brothers should act” (Liow, 2003, p. 340). 
However, atmosphere started to transform after Mahathir came to power. He wanted to 
discard the lingering perception of Malaysia being the ‘younger brother’ to Indonesia, 
arguing that bilateral relations should be based on equal footing and the international 
norms of inter-state relations be considered. In the 1990s, Malaysia’s activist 
diplomacy in regional and global affairs elevated the country to a new status on the 
international stage, making it difficult to accept the idea that Malaysia’s position was 
subordinate to that of Indonesia. Mahathir proposed the East Asia Economic Grouping 
without consulting Suharto, who opposed it ostensibly on the grounds that Indonesia 
did not support building a trade bloc. The real problem might be that Suharto, as 
the indisputable older brother in the region, felt slighted by the recalcitrant Mahathir. 
However, Indonesia had to accept the fact that a former younger and weaker brother 
had developed its own identity, personality and credibility, and that the ‘older-younger 
brother’ relationship, with all its hierarchical connotation, was no longer appropriate 
(Harun 2006). Anyway, the 1997 financial crisis and the fall of the Suharto regime 
shattered Indonesia’s credibility to act as an older brother and its leadership status in 
Southeast Asia as it was bogged down in crisis after crisis. Malaysia now considered 
Indonesia as a diplomatic equal in all respects. During his visit to Indonesia in 
February 2007, Prime Minister Abdullah stated that “(p)eople-to-people relations 
between our two countries have always been warm and positive. For me, Malaysia 
and Indonesia are like brothers” (Said, 2007, p. 2). Abdullah’s statement suggests 
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that the two nations should relate to each other on an equal footing, not as ‘older 
and younger brothers’. Actually Indonesian leaders and businessmen began to look 
toward Malaysia as a most successful developing country, with an economic strategy 
that Indonesia could emulate. Subagiyo (2002) from the Centre for National Urgency 
Studies in Jakarta urged Indonesians to learn from Malaysia’s economic success and 
stop feeling superior. 
Still, the conventional mindset continues among many Indonesians. Former Malaysian 
ambassador to Indonesia, Hamidon Ali, pointed out: 
We have over the years grown up but its [Indonesia’s] perception of us is 
still that we are the younger brother and the younger brother must always 
give in, give way to the elder brother. They (Indonesians) are in that 
frame of mind. This perception is top to bottom, more so at the lower 
level. They see us as so arrogant, so unbecoming of a younger brother 
(New Straits Times, 11 July 2005, p. 14).
This old frame of mind has slowly begun to wane as Malaysia progresses economically, 
whilst Indonesia is lagging behind. Economic assistance to Indonesia from the 
governments of Mahathir and Abdullah were well appreciated. Hamidon Ali himself 
believed that Indonesia was more likely to feel at ease in dealing with Malaysia when 
economically it became better off, and politically became more stable and organized to 
tackle a lot of its own problems (New Straits Times, 11 July 2005, p. 14). 
The Generation Gap: Lack of Knowledge & Understanding of Each Other
To challenge deference-based harmony might be a healthy correction of the traditional 
serumpun. However, generational changes in the two societies have left a lot to 
be done in order for the serumpun spirit itself to be carried on into the future. The 
older generations tended to emphasize the ‘special relationship’ and the numerous 
similarities between Malaysia and Indonesia, based on common ethnicity, language, 
culture and history. The younger generations considered the notion of such a special 
bond to be less relevant as a result of their education, and a lack of interaction 
between the younger generations from the two nations (Abdullah, 1993). In the case 
of Malaysia, despite its employment of Indonesian teachers and lecturers in the 1970s, 
its younger generation lacked real understanding of Indonesia. This might be due to 
inadequate exposure given to the neighbouring countries in the Malaysian education 
system, especially in relation to history and geography. The teaching of these two 
subjects in Malaysia, until recently, has been focused on Europe and America. E. 
Prasetyono, Director of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in Jakarta (personal communication, July 21, 2006) suggested: 
If we really want to be close like brothers it needs to be nurtured through 
education. There must be more teaching on Indonesia history in Malaysian 
school curriculum and vice versa. How did the people from the various 
Indonesian islands first migrate to Malaysia? We are in a sense the same 
community. 
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There are also other causal factors for the diverging perceptions and a weakening 
of the serumpun sentiment among the present day youth and new leaders born after 
independence in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Firstly, the lack of student exchanges 
from primary school through to universities has hampered an appreciation of serumpun 
among youth. Secondly, Non-Government Organisations and government-supported 
organizations such as the Malaysian Youth Council (Majlis Belia Malaysia) and the 
Indonesian Youth National Committee (Komiti Pemuda Nasional Indonesia) also lack 
the commitment to strengthen relationships between the youth in the two countries. 
Thirdly, the divergent processes of political socialization in the two countries have 
created problems in reaching a common understanding of serumpun among the youth. 
For instance, the style of ethnic politics in Malaysia is alien to many young Indonesians. 
Fourthly, Indonesia had strong student movements that were directly involved in 
the downfall of the Suharto regime, yet in Malaysia students were restricted from 
involvement in politics by the ‘Colleges and Universities Act’. This created hurdles in 
cooperation. A concern over the need to promote the serumpun sentiment among the 
youth was made known by the then Malaysian Ambassador to Indonesia, Abdullah 
Zawawi Mohamad, in as early as 1990 when he warned that if Malaysia and Indonesia 
wanted the serumpun factor to continue to be relevant in their bilateral relations, it 
had to be nurtured or otherwise the younger generation would ‘drift apart’ (Mohamad, 
1990, p. 3). 
The dialogue between the two countries’ political youth in the early 1990s demonstrated 
the manner in which the younger generations’ perceptions differed. For example, in 
Malacca UMNO’s youth wing hosted the first ever dialogue with the Indonesian youth 
from various organizations and political parties, although most were representatives 
of the ruling party Golkar (Abdullah, 1993). One of the objectives of UMNO’s youth 
wing was to revive the serumpun spirit. However, the Indonesian delegates were less 
enthusiastic and perceived the Malaysian enthusiasm for the concept of serumpun as a 
manifestation of Malaysian-style ethnic politics. Furthermore, many of the Indonesian 
delegates, especially those with ethnic Javanese background, believed that only those 
Indonesians who lived in eastern Sumatra and Riau islands could be referred to as 
Malays. The second dialogue was held in Bogor, Indonesia. Here, both Malaysian and 
Indonesian youth voiced dissatisfaction over the state of their current relationship and 
again reached anything but consensus on serumpun or serumpun-based political unity. 
Najib, the then President of UMNO Youth and leader of the Malaysian delegation, 
pointed out at the forum that the existing bilateral co-operation in certain areas merely 
paid ‘lip service’ to the special relationship (Abdullah, 1993). He noted that Indonesia 
imposed import restrictions on Malaysian books and films, while Malaysia had no 
such import restriction vis-à-vis Indonesia. He also questioned the double standard 
imposed by the Indonesian government on Malaysian Airlines, which was permitted to 
fly only four times a week to Jakarta but Singapore Airlines flew four times a day. This 
was anything but serumpun treatment. On the other hand, the Indonesian delegation 
raised the issue of the High Court of Malaysia’s decision to sentence to death an 
Indonesian drug smuggler in the state of Sabah, arguing that this was overly harsh and 
a clear miscarriage of justice. The Indonesians wanted the dialogue session to adopt a 
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resolution calling for a lighter sentence in the spirit of serumpun, which the Malaysian 
side rejected (Abdullah, 1993). These incidents forced the thoughtful members in both 
delegations to think hard and search for a new meaning for the serumpun concept, 
one which was more suited to the changed circumstances in both countries. In order 
to build closer relationship between the youth communities, it was suggested that the 
concept of serumpun should be popularized among the youth in both nations through 
the establishment of a serumpun youth program. The Indonesian Youth National 
Committee (under the Ministry of Youth and Sports) was persuaded to cooperate with 
the Malaysian Youth Council (under the Ministry of Youth and Sports Malaysia) to 
develop a program of serumpun ship, by which the youth from both countries would 
sail the historical routes to visit landmark places of Srivijaya, Majapahit and Mataram. 
They would also visit the old Sultanates, such as Aceh, Malacca, Kedah, Pontianak 
and Sulawesi to learn more about serumpun culture and establish relations with the 
communities in these areas (Abu Bakar, 1998).
At the same time is important to continue maintaining, but also broaden and deepen, 
exchanges between politicians especially the younger generation of main political 
parties and opinion leaders. UMNO and Golkar have established a collaborative 
relationship – for example, Golkar delegates attend the UMNO General Assembly 
as ‘observers’. However, given the proliferation of political parties in Indonesia, and 
the more robust trajectory of Malaysian political parties too, new ways should be 
explored to open up more dialogue channels for more aspiring actors. At a meeting in 
2007 between UMNO (led by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Najib) and the Golkar 
(led by Indonesia’s House of Representatives Speaker, Agung Laksono), both agreed 
to facilitate the exchange of media representatives of the two countries. This is an 
important initiative that the two governments should promote broadly, because it can 
help reduce the chance of sensational reports in the media that tend to negatively affect 
bilateral relations. In fact, sensationalizing and dramatizing the experiences of migrant 
workers and territorial issues unnecessarily added to the tension. The recent emotional 
outburst and protest by the youth groups in Indonesia, in relation to the use in Malaysia 
of Indonesia’s folk song Rasa Sayange, Barongan dance and Balinese’s Pendet dance 
to promote Malaysia’s own tourism, were also to do with the media’s sensationalist 
reports of cultural and historical issues.
Moreover, the ‘Eminent Persons Group’ (EPG) was established by Tun Abdullah 
Badawi and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administrations in July 2008, with the 
mandate to find ways to foster good relations between governments and peoples. 
Having seven representatives from each side, EPG acts as the highest advisory body in 
Malaysia and Indonesia and submits reports to the leaders incorporating proposals and 
recommendations to be discussed at the leadership consultations (Nik Anis, Eng Hock 
& Joh Teh, 2008). However, while institutionalized track-II is a positive step, EPG 
members are not representative. In particular, women and youth groups are not really 
represented. Voices of the die-hard old guards and traditional elites are important, 
but fresh opinions from the young generations and traditionally marginalized 
communities should also be heeded. Recently, the EPG made a recommendation to 
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both governments to establish a serumpun culture centre in each country in order to 
promote and educate the population especially the younger generation on common 
shared culture (Indonesia-Malaysia Perlu Bangun, 2011).
Considering the mixed trajectories of the serumpun sentiment and its increasingly 
ambiguous role in the relations, some leaders from both Malaysia and Indonesia 
began to show deep concerns and call for both countries find ways to strengthen 
their serumpun relations. New ways must be found to give more substance to the 
serumpun relations whilst accepting the fact that Malaysia and Indonesia are two 
sovereign states with different national interests. Economy and trade are already high 
on the agenda of the two countries’ foreign policies, and are the areas where more 
substance could be given to the serumpun concept. Malaysia showed a sympathetic 
attitude when Indonesia was badly hit by the financial and economic crisis in late 
1997, and committed itself to assist the Indonesian economy through increasing trade 
and encouraging Malaysian companies to invest in the country, despite its inherent 
political instability and regular occurrence of natural disasters. Bilateral trade has 
grown steadily, from US$5.1 billion in 2003 (Borneo Post, 10 December 2004, p. 
B2) to US$11.5 billion in 2007 and US$15.3 billion in 2008 (The China Post, August 
4, 2010). The ASEAN Free Trade Area established in 2003 may have also facilitated 
bilateral trade. Meanwhile, Malaysia has remained one of the top three international 
investors in Indonesia, with a total investment of US$2.2 billion in 2006 (Jakarta 
Post, 28 February 2007) and US$2.35 billion in 2007 (China Economic Net, 17 April 
2009). The growing economic interdependence should be the most effective means to 
strengthen serumpun on the basis of equal partnership.  
CONCLUSION
Many Malaysians and Indonesians still consider themselves as serumpun or ‘blood 
brothers’. They share a common ancestry and cultural heritage under the banner of 
the Malay race. In the past, serumpun played an important role in facilitating bilateral 
relations as it gave meaning to the ‘special relationship’. The unique historical human 
chemistry ensured that Malaysia placed Indonesia as the single most important country 
in its bilateral relations and vice versa. The serumpun relationship was an important 
basis for mutual assistance in times of economic difficulty and shared security 
concern. It can be argued that several serious conflicts between the two countries, such 
as Confrontation and the more recent territorial disputes, were able to be contained 
in part owing to this emotional connection. In the post-Cold War era, there emerged 
significant changes in the perceptions of serumpun, due to the generational gaps and 
new realities in national political, social and economic environments. As a result, the 
function of serumpun has became more ambiguous, and many older generation leaders 
have started to worry about the idea’s continuity, although serumpun, with its pan-
Malay ideology, still underpins a ‘special relationship’ and it is unlikely to run out 
of its natural course in the near future. However, new practical pillars particularly 
cooperation in trade and investment for the relationship must be built and strengthened 
to enrich the serumpun relations.
Proceedings of the Second on National Resilience (SNAR II)  35 
REFERENCES
A relationship worth nurturing. (2005, July 11). New Straits Times, p. 14.
Abdullah, F. (1993). The rumpun concept in Malaysia-Indonesia relations. The 
Indonesian Quarterly XXI/2, 137-150.
Abdul Hamid, A. F. (2007). Malay anti-colonialism in British Malaya: A re-appraisal 
of independence fighters of Peninsular Malaysia. Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 42/5, 371-398.
Abdul Mutalib, M. D. (1999).  I.C. Palsu: Merampas hak anak Sabah (Forgery I. D.: 
Confiscating the rights of Sabahans). Lahad Datu: IAD.
Ali, S. H. (1984). Social relations: The ethnic and class factors. In S. H. Ali (Ed.), 
Ethnicity, class and development Malaysia (pp. 13-31). Kuala Lumpur: 
Persatuan Sains Sosial.
Abu Bakar, M. (1998). Kerjasama serantau dalam hubungan diplomasi: Pengalaman 
Malaysia (Regional cooperation in diplomatic relations: Malaysian experience). 
In A. L. Abu Bakar (Ed.), Pertemuan Selat Melaka: Ke arah merealisasikan 
semangat ASEAN, IMST-GT, IMT-GT dan BIMP-EAGA. Melaka: Institut 
Kajian Sejarah dan Patriotism Malaysia (IKSEP).
Andaya, L. Y. (2004). The search for the “origins” of Melayu. In T. P. Barnard 
(Ed.), Contesting Malayness: Malay identity across boundaries (pp. 56-75). 
Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Andaya, B. W. & Andaya L. Y. (2001). A History of Malaysia. Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press. 
Andaya, L. Y. (2001). The search for the ‘origins’ of Melayu. Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore 32, 1-16.
Anwar, D. F. (1994). Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign policy and regionalism. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).
Brown, c. (2003). A short history of Indonesia: The unlikely nation? Crows Nest: 
Allen & Unwin.
Chalmers, I. (2006). Indonesia: An introduction to contemporary traditions. South 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Djamily, B. (1980). Hidup dan perjuangan Adam Malik (The life and struggle of 
Adam Malik). Jakarta: Selecta Group.
36                             Proceedings of the Second on National Resilience (SNAR II)
Doeppers, D. F. (1972). An incident in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion of 1958. Indonesia, 
14, 185-195. Retrived from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350738.
Elmhirst, R. (2000). A Javanese dispora? Gender and identity politics in Indonesia’s 
transmigration resettlement program. Women’s Studies International Forum, 
23/4, 487-500. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezprxy.library.
uwa.edu/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi.
Harun, R. (2006). Kerjasama dan konflik dalam hubungan Malaysia-Indonesia 
(Conflict and co-operation in Malaysia-Indonesia relations. In R. Harun (ed.), 
Malaysia’s Foreign Relations: Issues and Challenges (pp. 49-74). Kuala 
Lumpur: University Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur.
Hng Hung Yong. (2004). Five men and five ideas: Building national identity. Subang 
Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn Bhd.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72/3, 22-49.
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung (1973). Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-
1965. The Hague: Mouton.
Indonesia and Malaysia expected bilateral trade to hit US$15 billion. (2010, August 
4). The China Post. Retrieved from www.chinapost,com,tw/business/asia/
indonesia/2010/08/04/267309.
Indonesia, Malaysia vow to boost trade. (2009, April 17). China Economic Net. 
Retrieved from http://en.ce.net.cn/World/Asia-Pacific/200903.
Indonesia-Malaysia perlu bangun Pusat Kebudayaan Serumpun (Indonesia-Malaysia 
need to establish a Serumpun Cultural Centre) (2010, May 17). Retrieved from 
http://,antaranews.com/berita/1274064014/.
Kadir, M. A. (1991). Keamanan sejagat: Peranan Malaysia dalam politik antarabangsa 
(World peace: Malaysia role in international politics). Kuala Lumpur: Dewan 
Bahasa dan Pustaka.
Klinken, G. V. (2003). Ethnicity in Indonesia. In C. Mackerras (Ed.), Ethnicity in Asia 
(pp. 64-87). London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Kunjungan ke Malaysia: Menyelesaikan permasalahan, memperkuat persahabatan (A 
visit to Malaysia: Solving problems, enhancing friendship). (2011). Retrieved 
from http://icalbakrie.com/?p=1310.
Lian Kwen Fee (2001). The construction of Malay identity across nations Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia. In Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, 
157/4, 861-879. Retrieved from www.kitlu-journals.nl/index.php/btlu/article/
view/3138/3899.
Proceedings of the Second on National Resilience (SNAR II)  37 
Liow, J. C. (2005). The politics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations: One kin, two nations. 
London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Liow, J. C. (2003). Visions of serumpun: Tun Abdul Razak and the golden years 
of Indo-Malay blood brotherhood, 1967-1975. Southeast Asia Research, 11/3, 
327-350. 
Malaysia looks to increasing investments in Indonesia. (2004, December 20), The 
Borneo Post, B2.
Milne, R. S. & Mauzy D. K. (1986). Malaysia: Tradition, modernity and Islam. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
Milner, A. (2004). Afterword: A history of Malay ethnicity. In T. P. Barnard (Ed.), 
Contesting Malayness: Malay identity across boundaries (pp. 241-257). 
Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Ministry of External Affairs Malaysia. (1964). Malaysia’s case in the United Nations 
Security Council. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press.
Mohamad, A. Z. (1990). Malaysia and Indonesia bilateral relations: Malaysian View. 
Paper presented at the Second Malaysia-Indonesia Conference, Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, (ISIS) Malaysia and the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia, December 11-14, in Kuala Lumpur.
Muniandy, K. (1996). Hubungan Malaysia-Indonesia 1957-1970 (Malaysia-Indonesia 
relations 1957-1970). Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
Nik Anis, M, Eng Hock & Joh Teh (2008, July 8). Joint advisory body set up to Foster 
Closer KL-Jakarta ties. The Star. Retrieved from http://thestar.com.my/news/
story.asp?file=/2008/7/8/nation/21763025&sec=nation.
Poulgrain, G. (1998). The genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia 1945-
1965. Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd.
Rajaratnam, S. (1964). Malaysia and the world. Singapore: The Government Printing 
Office.
Reid, A. (2004). Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a source of diverse modern 
identities. In T. P. Barnard (Ed.), Contesting Malayness: Malay identity across 
boundaries (pp. 1-24). Singapore:  Singapore University Press.
Reinhardt, J. M. (1967). Nationalism and confrontation in the South-east Asian 
islands: The sources of Indonesian foreign policy. Ph.D Dissertation. Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Inc.
38                             Proceedings of the Second on National Resilience (SNAR II)
Pereira, D. (1999). Indonesia ‘accepts’ KL’s loan withdrawal. Indonesia Daily News. 
Retrived from: http://www.indo-news.com.
RI, Malaysia agree to strengthen ties. (2007, February 28). Jakarta Post. Retrieved 
from http://www.the jakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20070223.A08.
Said, R. (2007, February 23). Abdullah: We are friends through thick and thin. New 
Straits Times. Retrieved from  http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/nst/Friday/ 
National/20070223100120/Article.
Shulman, S. (1998). Review: Samuel Huntington’s the clash of civilizations and the 
remaking of world order. The Journal of Politics, 60/1, 304-06.
Singh, B. (2000). Succession politics in Indonesia: The 1998 presidential elections 
after the fall of Suharto. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Subagiyo, S. (2002, August 13). Dr M, Presiden M. Sinar Harapan. Retrieved from 
http://www.polarhome.com/pipermail/nasional-m/2002-August/000011.html.
Suryadinata, L. (2002). Elections and politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies.
Sutherland, H. (2004). The Makassar Malays: Adaptation and identity, c. 1660-1790. 
In T. P. Barnard (Ed.), Contesting Malayness: Malay identity across boundaries 
(pp. 76-1-6). Singapore:  Singapore University Press.
Verma, V. (2002). Malaysia: State and civil society in transition. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner.
Wanandi, J. (1988). Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations. The Indonesian Quarterly. 
XVI/4, 454-463.
